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Abstract 
 
This short introduction sets out the rationale for the special issue. It introduces the concepts 
of intergovernmental relations (IGR) and party political incongruence which are central to 
the analyses contained in the volume. It considers the nature and form of intergovernmental 
relations in the early years of devolution, under conditions of predominant party 
 2 
congruence in the composition of the central and sub-state governments. It then develops 
the hypothesised relationship between party political incongruence and intergovernmental 
relations, focusing on the nature and structure of IGR. It introduces the key questions to be 
addressed in the volume and each of the subsequent contributions which explore this 
relationship in greater depth. 
 
Introductory article includes one table. 
 
Keywords: inter-governmental, UK, devolution, parties 
 
Word count: 5417 
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One of the traditional hallmarks of British parliamentary democracy has been its 
adversarial character. Even within the context of today’s multi-party politics, political 
debate is dominated by competition between government and opposition, with the principal 
opposition party assuming the role of a shadow government. The formation of a governing 
coalition between the Conservative Party and the Liberal Democrats has done little to alter 
this fundamental feature of British politics.  
 
The adversarial character of British party politics is usually considered from a horizontal, 
mono-level perspective, when the government faces opposition from one or several parties 
in parliament. However, in multi-level systems, where power is divided between central 
and sub-state governments, opposition can also be played out vertically via 
intergovernmental relations (IGR), especially when governments at different levels are led 
by distinct political parties (party incongruence). The emergence of party political 
incongruence in the composition of central and devolved governments, especially after the 
devolved elections of 2007, provides an opportunity to examine whether the adversarial 
tradition of British politics has also been evident in the intergovernmental arena. Hence, the 
key purpose of this special issue is to examine the effect of party congruence and 
incongruence on the character and dynamics of intergovernmental relations in the context 
of UK devolution. 
 
The term ‘intergovernmental relations’ (IGR) captures ‘the working connections that tie 
central governments to those constituent units that enjoy measures of independent and 
inter-dependent political power, governmental control and decision-making’ (Agranoff, 
2004: 26).  
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Across multi-level states, IGR take place between governmental units of all types and 
levels, from the municipal to the supranational level (e.g. Anderson, 1960; Wright, 1982; 
Agranoff 2004; Bolleyer, 2009; Heinmiller 2002; Scharpf, 2001). Such interactions can be 
bilateral or multi-lateral, involving two or more institutional partners. They can be 
conducted vertically, between one level of government and another, or horizontally, 
between governing authorities from the same governmental tier. IGR involve not just the 
formal meetings between government ministers and senior officials, but also public 
officials of varying levels of seniority and importance in a complex web of day-to-day 
interactions and exchanges of views (Wright, 1982: 8-22).  
 
IGR also have a very important interpersonal dimension, which Wright referred to as ‘the 
human element’, that is, the activities, attitudes and personalities of those individuals 
holding office, and their perceptions of other players’ motivations, actions and attitudes 
(ibid.). In addition, the character of IGR can vary between policy fields, with respect to the 
intensity of intergovernmental interaction and the degree of co-operation, conflict and 
compromise. For example, intergovernmental interaction may be more frequent in highly 
Europeanized policy fields, given the need for member states to speak with one voice in the 
European Council. The extent to which the respective players in an intergovernmental 
relationship can achieve outcomes which match their policy preferences can tell us much 
about the power dynamics underpinning IGR. However, outcomes may also be determined 
by the relative importance of particular policy issues to institutional and individual players. 
Naturally, a central government can make concessions with respect to a policy matter of 
little concern to its own agenda without necessarily ceding authority in the 
intergovernmental relationship.  
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This volume focuses on one particular set of actors in IGR – namely the central and 
devolved governments of the UK. Since devolution took place in 1999, IGR have 
developed in a largely piecemeal and pragmatic fashion. There were no constitutional 
blueprints or grand plans for governments to follow in conducting their intergovernmental 
exchanges. Instead, a series of informal intergovernmental agreements, or concordats, were 
endorsed by the devolved administrations and central government, and in the latter case, 
more often with individual departments of state (Poirier, 2001; Bogdanor, 2001). Path-
dependency played a significant role in shaping the character of IGR; informal agreements 
or concordats to streamline the relationship between the UK and devolved governments 
after devolution were built upon the inter-departmental interactions underpinning pre-
devolution relationships between the territorial departments of the UK government - the 
Scottish Office, the Welsh Office and, from 1972 with the imposition of direct rule, the 
Northern Ireland Office - and other Whitehall departments.  
 
IGR, then, is our dependent variable. These relations are assessed empirically by analyzing 
two distinctive dimensions. The first concerns the nature of intergovernmental interactions 
which can include the intensity of meetings, as well as the competitive, conflictual or 
cooperative nature of intergovernmental exchanges. The second concerns the structures that 
channel intergovernmental interactions, for example, the machinary of intergovernmental 
relations, and the composition of intergovernmental institutions and the decision-making 
rules governing them. Both dimensions are often related; high institutionalization of 
structures tends to imply more intense and more cooperative exchanges (Bolleyer, 2009: 
18-20). However, in the UK case, incongruity in the political composition of central and 
devolved governments has emerged in an institutional setting in which the level of 
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formalization and institutionalization of intergovernmental structures is low by comparative 
standards.  
 
In the early years of devolution, the structures of IGR were largely bilateral, vertical and 
informal, with an emphasis upon interactions among middle-ranking officials. The 
machinery, or infrastructure, of intergovernmental relations was weakly developed, 
especially when contrasted with the formal machinery through which intergovernmental 
relations are often conducted in other multi-level states (Cameron and Simeon, 2002; 
Simeon, 2006; Watts 2007; Benz 2009). Relations were at the same time largely co-
operative and trouble-free (The House of Lords Committee on the Constitution, 2002; 
Horgan, 2004; Trench, 2005; 2007a; Laffin, et al., 2007). There were few evident 
intergovernmental tensions, and the formal dispute resolution mechanisms put in place 
through the Joint Ministerial Committee (a multilateral forum bringing together the UK 
Prime Minister and the devolved First Ministers) were never invoked. 
 
What can account for the low degree of institutionalization of intergovernmental structures 
and the relatively harmonious nature of IGR in these early years? There are many potential 
drivers which shape the character of IGR in particular multi-level states. IGR may be 
shaped by the design of the constitution or the institutional framework for interaction, as 
well as by economic and political factors, including the territorial distribution of wealth, the 
electoral and parliamentary strength of governments at different levels and the personal 
qualities and popularity of governments and leaders (Bolleyer, 2009; Watts 1997, Wright 
1992).  
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This special issue focuses on examining the importance of one possible driver – the party 
political composition of state and sub-state governments. Our working hypothesis is that 
the relatively harmonious and informal nature of IGR in the early years of devolution was 
at least in part a result of the prevalence of party congruence in the relationship between the 
UK and devolved governments. Except for Northern Ireland, the Labour party played the 
sole or lead role in the UK, Scottish and Welsh governments until May 2007. Consequently 
we might expect that the more widespread incongruence which emerged after the 2007 
devolved elections in Scotland and Wales would have pushed IGR into a more contentious 
and more institutionalized direction.  
 
The Role of Political Parties in IGR 
 
The political developments within the UK since 2007 make it an ideal test-bed for 
assessing the relative importance of political party composition as an independent variable 
capable of explaining change in the nature and form of IGR in the UK. From 1999 until 
2007, the political composition of government across ‘mainland Britain’ was broadly 
congruent. While Labour held UK government office with a healthy majority, the party was 
the senior partner in a stable coalition government with the Liberal Democrats in the first 
and second sessions of the Scottish parliament, and briefly shared power with the Liberal 
Democrats in Wales before and after governing alone as a minority government or with a 
slender majority. Meanwhile, Northern Ireland, which has a wholly distinctive party 
system, experienced a halting start to devolution and recurrent periods during which the 
Northern Ireland Assembly was suspended (see Table 1).  
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Table 1: Government Formation since Devolution, 1999-2011 
 Westminster Scotland Wales Northern Ireland** 
1999-2003 Labour majority Lab-Lib Dem 
Majority 
Lab minority 
(- Oct. 2000) 
Lab-Lib Dem 
majority 
Cross-party 
consociational 
govt, led by UUP 
& SDLP (-2002) 
2003-2007 Labour majority Lab-Lib Dem 
Majority 
Lab ‘majority’ 
(-2005)*;  
Labour minority 
(2005-2007) 
Suspension of 
devolution 
2007-2011 Labour majority 
(-2010) 
Cons-Lib Dem 
majority 
SNP minority Lab-Plaid 
Cymru 
majority 
Cross-party 
consociational 
govt, led by DUP 
& Sinn Fein 
* Labour won exactly half of the Assembly’s 60 seats in 2003, but an opposition AM was elected to the 
position of Presiding Officer, thus giving them a nominal majority of 1. This ended when Peter Law, the AM 
for Blaenau Gwent, defected from Labour to become an Independent, in protest against the imposition of all-
women shortlists for candidacies for the 2005 General Election 
** The Northern Ireland Assembly was suspended between February and May 2000; 24-hour suspensions in 
August 2001 and September 2001; and from October 2002. A transitional assembly was set up in October 
2006, paving the way for the restoration of devolution in 2007 (Northern Ireland Assembly, 2011 
http://www.niassembly.gov.uk/io/summary/new_summary.htm#7) 
 
The political landscape changed after 2007, with the arrival of an SNP minority 
government in Scotland and a Labour-Plaid Cymru coalition in Wales. Incongruence was 
reinforced by the restoration of the Northern Ireland Assembly, where the distinctive party 
system and consociational government produce permanent political incongruence vis-à-vis 
the rest of the UK. Party differences were further reinforced by the election of the UK 
Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition government in 2010. It is therefore timely to 
assess whether the third session of devolved government – 2007-2011 – generated a new 
climate in IGR, transferring the adversarial party politics traditionally associated with 
Westminster parliamentary politics to the vertical axis of the multi-level arena.  
 
Party political incongruence may be expected to affect IGR both in an organizational and in 
a programmatic sense. First, parties can provide important organizational linkages bridging 
jurisdictional divisions. When operating within different constituent governments and on 
different governmental levels, they fulfil an important integrative function and facilitate 
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policy coordination by providing channels for information exchange and conflict 
resolution. Conversely, the absence of such organizational linkages during periods of party 
incongruence can heighten conflict both horizontally and vertically (Lehmbruch, 1998). 
Second, party incongruence is likely to exacerbate the programmatic differences between 
tiers of government. This can complicate the intergovernmental coordination of legislative 
and policy outcomes necessitated by overlapping competencies and spill-over effects.  
 
The extent to which IGR are shaped by party political congruence or incongruence may 
also depend on the degree of incongruence. Incongruence is complete if there is no overlap 
in the party political composition of governments, and governments at different levels are 
composed of distinctive parties (either in single party or coalition governments). If 
governments at different levels are only partially ruled by different parties, we may speak 
of partial incongruence. As Table 1 indicates, the intergovernmental arrangements in the 
UK have included varying degrees of incongruence, from coalition governments within the 
devolved administrations in which an opposing political party is the junior partner, to the 
total incongruence witnessed after the 2010 UK general election. Whatever the effect of 
incongruence on IGR, we might expect it to be more pronounced under conditions of 
complete incongruence, as has been the case across the UK since 2010.  
 
In addition, there are other intermediary variables which may exacerbate or moderate the 
effect of party congruence or incongruence in any multi-level system. First, we must 
consider the nature of the party system, and the extent to which it varies across institutional 
tiers and territorial communities. For example, where the party system associated with sub-
state elections is highly distinctive from the system of party competition in state-wide 
elections, we might expect that the effects of party incongruence on IGR would be less 
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apparent. In general, low levels of territorial integration are usually associated with more 
conflictual IGR, given that the political and electoral stakes of intergovernmental 
competition are reduced for each governmental actor (Chandler and Chandler, 1987; 
Lehmbruch, 1998; Swenden and Maddens, 2009). But, in highly decentralised party 
systems, we would expect this to be the case regardless of the party in power, thus 
diminishing the extent to which party congruence and incongruence can explain variation 
in intergovernmental dynamics. Parties within more integrated party systems, on the other 
hand, may use the opportunities afforded by intergovernmental relations under conditions 
of party incongruence to conduct their electoral battles within the intergovernmental arena.  
 
Alongside the territorial integration of party systems, we must also consider the territorial 
organisation and cohesion within political parties. There are wide variations within and 
across multi-level states with respect to the degree of vertical integration - the 
organisational linkages, interdependence and co-operation - between the central and 
regional branches of state-wide political parties (Thorlakson, 2009: 160-2). In Canada, 
political parties are weakly integrated across territorial communities, while in the United 
States, levels of vertical integration are high. State-wide parties in most European multi-
level states maintain high levels of vertical integration, albeit with varying opportunities to 
exercise autonomy within their region or to influence the decisions of the central party 
(Dyck, 1991; Hopkin, 2003; Thorlakson, 2009).  
 
The degree of vertical integration within the three ‘state-wide’ parties remains high, 
especially in relation to Westminster elections, with relatively little change in the 
opportunities for regional branches to influence national policy. Regional branches enjoy 
more autonomy over devolved elections and devolved policies, but the parties’ ethos and 
 11 
identity remains strong across these institutional boundaries. This shared identity is evident 
even within the federally-structured Liberal Democrats, but has been most apparent in the 
Labour Party (Hopkin and Bradbury, 2006; Laffin, et al., 2007). Northern Ireland is, of 
course, the exception, with its unique party system which pre-dates the re-establishment of 
devolution here. Although Sinn Fein competes in the Irish Republic, with respect to the UK 
state, all Northern Irish parties are non-state-wide parties; the UK’s state-wide parties have 
no presence in either Westminster or Assembly elections in Northern Ireland. 
 
With regard to the party system in which these parties compete, there is considerable 
variation. Most notably, the presence of powerful nationalist parties in Scotland and Wales 
alters the nature of party competition here. These party systems long pre-date devolution, 
and indeed helped to engender constitutional change, but the creation of multi-level 
government reinforces party system differences and has the potential to bring them into the 
intergovernmental arena. The effect of party incongruence on IGR may thus depend on 
which particular parties make up the incongruent relationship, and the nature of party 
competition between them. 
 
The relative strength and incumbency of parties can also shape how IGR unfold. Bolleyer 
found that in parliamentary systems, sub-state governments that usually take the form of 
one party cabinets are less inclined to engage in binding, highly institutionalised and multi-
lateral intergovernmental relationships than governments that feature (non-compulsory) 
power-sharing or coalition arrangements (Bolleyer, 2009: 204-5). Majority governments 
may also be in a stronger position to set the agenda, both within their own legislative arena 
and in the arena of IGR.  
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Key Questions and Structure of the Issue 
 
This volume focuses on the development of IGR during the first three terms of devolution, 
from 1999-2011. Its overall aim is to assess the impact of party congruence and 
incongruence on the character and dynamics of IGR in the UK. In so doing, we collectively 
explore two sets of questions. First, has party political incongruence affected 
intergovernmental structures, that is, the level of institutionalization of the 
intergovernmental bodies and fora in which governments interact? Has it led to a reform of 
the machinery of IGR? Has the informal, day-to-day, intra-party and inter-departmental 
interaction characteristic of the period of party congruence given way to a more formal or 
institutionalized intergovernmental relationship? Second, has party political incongruence 
affected the nature of intergovernmental interaction? Have interaction patterns become 
more antagonistic? Has incongruence led to stalemate in areas that require 
intergovernmental coordination, or generated outcomes that are more favourable (through 
hierarchy, or persuasion) to one party in the relationship?  
 
We recognise that additional features may interact with party political incongruence to 
moderate or exacerbate its effect, and some of these are specific to the UK context. As a 
‘regionally devolved union’ (Watts, 1999), the constituent units of the UK lack the 
constitutionally entrenched autonomy enjoyed by sub-state governments in classic federal 
states, and they remain highly dependent on central government for financial and other 
resources (Elazar, 1987; Watts, 1999; Swenden, 2006; Trench, 2007b; Bell and Christie, 
2007). Constitutional and fiscal resources remain concentrated in the hands of the UK 
government, while the latter also enjoys the lion’s share of those less tangible resources 
related to the access to information, organisational support and policy expertise. In his 
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analysis of central-local IGR, Rhodes argued that the relative power of central and local 
government and the interactions and interdependence between them is determined by the 
availability, distribution and substitutability of resources. A local authority – or in our case, 
a devolved government – would be dependent upon a central government department to the 
extent that it needs resources controlled by that department and can’t get them elsewhere 
(1999: 78-9). The devolved institutions are better resourced than local governments, but 
their continued dependence on central government – constitutionally, financially and with 
respect to informational resources - may constrain their autonomy and limit their capacity 
to become powerful intergovernmental players (Swenden and McEwen, 2008). These 
additional features – or intervening variables – are considered in each of the contributions 
to this volume. 
 
IGR in most countries is difficult to penetrate for social scientists, given that so much of it 
takes place in private meetings behind close doors, away from the gaze of the media. This 
is especially the case in the UK given the prevalence and preference for informal 
interaction over more formal intergovernmental summitry. The volume thus begins with a 
commentary by one of the most influential players in UK intergovernmental relations in 
recent years. As Director-General for Devolution, Jim Gallagher had a central role in co-
ordinating relations between the UK government and the devolved administrations 
especially after party political incongruence was enhanced in 2007. His analysis provides 
us with a valuable insight into the evolution of IGR, the manner in which 
intergovernmental interaction has been conducted, and the cause and content of 
intergovernmental disputes. Gallagher offers some explanations for why the 
intergovernmental relationship in the period between 2007 and 2011 was marked more by 
continuity than change.  
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The next contribution by Michael Keating considers the purpose of IGR in a broad 
comparative sense, before examining their evolution in the UK. In so doing, he considers 
IGR in the UK in light of the nature and evolution of the state itself. The UK is not a 
federal state but an asymmetrical union in which the government of the whole state is also 
the government of its largest constituent part. There is no ‘central level’ distinct from 
England, and the understanding of what the state, or the ‘union’, means varies within and 
across the territories constituting the UK. This can act as a significant barrier to the 
development of a comprehensive system of IGR, whether its purpose is to support policy 
harmonization or to manage externalities or policy ‘overspills’. Indeed, Keating argues that 
an elaborate system of IGR in the UK would be both difficult to achieve and unnecessary, 
suggesting instead that in the UK as elsewhere, competitive federalism and regionalism are 
on the rise. 
 
The next three contributions examine IGR from the perspective of each of the devolved 
territories. In the first of the case study contributions, Paul Cairney examines IGR between 
the Scottish government and the UK government. Arguably, the largest political shift since 
devolution occurred in Scotland where in 2007, an SNP government replaced the Labour-
Liberal Democrat coalition which had been in power since 1999. Although as a coalition 
government, the latter involved partial incongruence, the Labour Party was clearly the 
dominant partner and so the intergovernmental relationship was marked more by 
congruence than incongruence. In his article, Cairney assesses to what extent the election 
of the SNP government in 2007 reshaped Scotland’s intergovernmental relationship with 
Whitehall. He argues that changes continued to be incremental rather than seismic, in part 
because of the constitutional balance of power between the UK and Scottish governments. 
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Furthermore, the SNP government’s minority status in 2007-2011 made it dependent on 
cross-party support within the Scottish Parliament to push through its most radical 
programmatic points. Its occasional failure to achieve such support meant that some 
politically contentious issues failed to reach the intergovernmental arena. Finally, in its 
efforts to prove that it could deliver good government and good policy for Scotland, the 
SNP proved willing to engage with the UK government and even tap from its comparative 
resource strengths, especially when the UK government was engaged in international and 
EU affairs.  
 
This international dimension is explored further in the contribution by Richard Wyn Jones 
and Elin Royles, who examine Welsh-UK intergovernmental dynamics through a case 
study of Welsh paradiplomacy. Paradiplomacy, or the international activities of sub-state 
governments, may seem an unlikely choice of study since in the UK international affairs 
are reserved to the UK government. Yet, where the UK operates internationally in policies 
that are devolved domestically, the autonomy of the devolved territories in their fields of 
jurisdiction can be curtailed. It is thus commonplace for sub-state governments to engage in 
external relations, but this inevitably involves activity which is at the interface of devolved 
and reserved competences, creating the potential for intergovernmental tension. Examining 
the intergovernmental dynamics generated by the Welsh Assembly government’s external 
relations is also an interesting case for considering the effects of party competition in a 
context of (until 2010) partial incongruence. Following the establishment of the Labour-
Plaid Cymru coalition in 2007, the Welsh Assembly minister in charge of regional 
economic development was the leader of Plaid Cymru, the Welsh Nationalist party, 
whereas the Labour Party leader and First Minister of Wales, controlled international 
development as part of a broader international relations portfolio. Comparing the 
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international engagement of Wales’ regional economic development with international 
development could then potentially demonstrate how paradiplomacy is used differently, for 
instance as part of a wider nation and state-building project by the Plaid Cymru minister, or 
as part of a joined-up approach with the UK government to international development by 
the Welsh First Minister. However, the authors argue that given Wales’ limited political 
autonomy, partial incongruence made little difference either to the nature of Welsh 
paradiplomacy or to the pattern of intergovernmental dynamics between Wales and 
London. By contrast, the period of full party political incongruence following the change of 
UK government in 2010 signalled greater tension in Welsh-UK IGR, especially in issues of 
finance. 
 
The final case study contribution by Derek Birrell explores IGR from a Northern Irish 
perspective. Northern Ireland stands out among our case studies because of the permanent 
incongruence between the parties in power in the NI Assembly and the party of UK 
government. IGR with the centre also acquire specific features due to the power-sharing 
nature of the Northern Ireland executive. As such, Northern Ireland is a good example for 
demonstrating how ‘intra-governmental’ relations within Northern Ireland can affect the 
intergovernmental relationship with the UK government. Reflecting its ‘bi-national’ nature, 
IGR not only take place in a UK context, but also engage the Irish Republic in the process. 
Birrell first considers how the internal ideological cleavage between nationalists and 
unionists has affected the nature of the intergovernmental relationship with the UK 
government, especially with the Northern Ireland Office, which remains a politically 
significant player. He then argues that forums such as the Council of the Isles and the 
British-Irish Council have played an unexpectedly strong role in keeping the prospect of 
devolution open when it was temporarily suspended. As such, the British-Irish Council has 
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developed into an intergovernmental body in which Northern Irish political actors from 
both sides of the nationalist/unionist divide continue to engage. The joint involvement of 
the UK and Irish governments has given the BIC a more ‘neutral’ character than a domestic 
Joint Ministerial Committee, which Irish nationalists perceive as institutionally British.  
 
The next two articles in the volume conduct focused analyses of two of the institutional 
features peculiar to the UK which may moderate the effects of party incongruence on IGR: 
the civil service and the courts. The structure and operation of these institutions and their 
largely apolitical character can support intergovernmental co-operation and co-ordination 
even under conditions of party competition. The Home Civil Service, examined in the 
contribution by Richard Parry, has remained largely depoliticised since devolution, and 
continues to share an identity as a unified organisation. Senior civil servants are socialized 
within the same institutional environment and respect similar operating procedures. Even 
the Northern Ireland civil service maintains close ties to the Home Civil Service despite the 
independence it has upheld for many decades. In addition, the civil service remains 
apolitical across the UK; senior civil servants are not politically appointed and remain in 
office when their political masters change party colours. Parry considers how both of these 
factors have helped to oil (lubricate) and glue (hold together) IGR even in the context of 
party political incongruence. While recognizing the important contribution of the civil 
service in both regards, he questions its ability to perform this function in the long term, 
even if party congruence were to be restored. The ‘interdepartmental’ mode of working 
does not suit a devolved setting in which civil servants are accountable to different 
governments. Furthermore, path-dependent operating procedures lose significance as more 
civil servants are externally recruited and access to key Whitehall departments is gradually 
reduced. Parry argues that the biggest difficulty would arise if Whitehall no longer 
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interpreted the devolved administrations as tolerable small-scale exceptions whose wishes 
could be accommodated. In a context of growing policy divergence and a scarcity of public 
resources, this could well turn out to be the case.  
 
Much like the civil service, the courts in the UK may be perceived as ‘apolitical’ actors 
with the potential to shape intergovernmental interactions and outcomes. In some multi-
level states, the courts emerge as powerful players in the intergovernmental arena, often 
playing a major role in intergovernmental dispute resolution. However, since devolution in 
1999, the courts in the United Kingdom have been engaged in devolution matters to only a 
very limited extent (contrary to at least some pre-devolution expectations). In his 
contribution, Alan Trench explores why this is the case. Although he suggests that party 
congruence in the early years supported the development of informal and cordial relations 
between the governments of the UK, he stresses that the continuation of a minimal role for 
the courts in mediating IGR can also be found in the political nature of the UK’s unwritten 
constitution, and the constrained role usually played by lawyers and legal considerations in 
the practice of government in the UK. The UK’s constitutional arrangements have an in-
built flexibility, as well as an in-built hierarchy which reinforces the superiority of the UK 
government, making it less likely that constitutional disputes will end up in the courts.   
 
In the final contribution, we return to the key questions posed at the outset to examine 
whether and to what extent party political congruence and incongruence has shaped the 
dynamics and process of intergovernmental interaction in the UK, in light of the evidence 
presented in each of the contributions. We will also situate the findings in a comparative 
context. We argue that IGR in the UK are less adversarial than IGR in comparable multi-
level states, such as Spain or Canada, even in periods of party political incongruence. This 
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is despite the UK’s political culture remaining arguably more adversarial than these other 
multi-level states (even within the devolved institutions elected by proportional 
representation). Our contribution explores both the institutional features of the UK state 
which distinguish it from other multi-level states, alongside the other mediating factors 
relating to party systems and party strength, to explain why party political incongruence 
has thus far had an only limited impact on intergovernmental relations in the UK. 
 
Each of the contributions in this volume emerged from presentations delivered as part of 
our ESRC Seminar Series, Reforming Intergovernmental Relations in a Context of Party 
Political Incongruence? (RES-451-26-0535). This series of five seminars, held between 
2008 and 2010, brought together UK and international scholars of multi-level government 
alongside practitioners working within the UK government and each of the devolved 
administrations. We generously acknowledge and thank the ESRC for their support. 
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